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Abstract 
This article examines the institutional challenges that 
Greek security policy is facing and offers some 
suggestions regarding the mechanisms that are needed 
for a more effective security and crisis management 
policy. The inefficiency of Greek security policy derives 
among other things from the fact that the existing 
institutional structures are inadequate and poorly 
organized. The prospect of introducing a new institutional 
body, the National Security Council, will also be 
examined in order to demonstrate that such an institution 
although helpful should not be treated as a panacea. 
 
Introduction 
This article aims to analyse the deficiencies in Greek 
security policy and demonstrate that Greece falls short of 
advancing its institutions and coordination policy to 
adequately face the new security challenges in a rapidly 


































refer to the security challenges and priorities that Greece is 
facing in the 21st century and identify the main factors that 
shape its security policy. Afterwards, the article will focus on 
the institutional factor, exhibit its inefficiency and examine 
the possibility of introducing a new institutional body, the 
National Security Council (NSC).  
The Greek Security Context 
The end of the Cold War has brought considerable changes 
in the international landscape, added new items in the global 
security agenda and altered old ones. Along with every other 
member of the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation (NATO), Greece had to reformulate its 
foreign and defence policy priorities and adjust to the new 
security needs presented by an unstable and fluid 
international environment. Nevertheless, a closer look at the 
security context that emerged after the end of the Cold War, 
demonstrates that Greece’s ‘readjustment’ is rather unique 
and complex, since it combines elements of both change 
and continuity.1 
On the one hand, Athens had to adjust to the new 
security environment that emerged after the end of the Cold 
War. Being part of the Balkan peninsular and the Eastern 
Mediterranean, Greece is geographically located in an 
unstable zone. The disintegration of former Yugoslavia, 
political instability in the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (FYROM), the future status of Kosovo and 
Albanian nationalism clearly highlight the magnitude of the 
stakes that the new regional environment has brought 
about.2 Greece, integrated into key Western institutions (EU 
and NATO), looks toward the Balkans, across the Black Sea 
and the Mediterranean to areas, where security threats are 
becoming more complex.3 The world has entered a new era 
                     
1 For an account on Greek security policy after the Cold War see selectively 
Fotios Moustakis and Michael Sheehan, “Greek Security Policy after the 
Cold War,” Contemporary Security Policy, vol.21, no.3 (2000), pp.95-
115; Thanos Dokos, “Greece in a Changing Strategic Setting” in 
Theodore Couloumbis, Theodore Kariotis and Fotini Bellou (eds), 
Greece in the Twentieth Century (London: Frank Cass, 2003), pp.42-68 
and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, “The Priorities of Greek Foreign Policy 
Today,” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, vol.5, no.3 (2005), 
pp.327-346. 
2 Stephen Larrabee, “Greece’s Balkan Policy in a New Strategic Era,” 
Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, vol.5, no.3 (2005), pp.405-
425. 
3 Ian O. Lesser, “Greece’s New Geopolitical Environment,” Southeast 
























where  ‘new security threats’ like the proliferation of mass 
destruction, international terrorism, trans-national crime, 
drug trafficking, religious extremism, migration and 
environmental pollution can not be addressed effectively on 
a purely national basis, but demand bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation, like intelligence sharing and police 
cooperation.4 Greece’s two year-term (2005-2006) as a 
member of the United Nations Security Council vividly 
demonstrate its commitment to respond to global challenges 
and broaden its security agenda. 
On the other hand, Athens had to deal with ‘traditional’ 
threats as well. For most European countries, the collapse of 
the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union triggered a profound 
change in their security policies. Greece has been the 
exception to this rule, because for decades Greek security 
policy considerations have been dominated by the threat 
from Ankara, not that posed by Moscow.5 In the post-Cold 
War era, Turkey still remains the main security concern for 
Athens.6  
Over the 1990s, Greece and Turkey have witnessed 
several bilateral crises. In 1994, Greece and Cyprus 
declared a Joint Defence Doctrine (JDD), which is a 
defensive initiative with two military objectives: (a) reducing 
Cyprus’ vulnerability and increasing the cost of any offensive 
move; (b) preventing any territorial change through the use 
of force.7 In this context, any attack against the Republic of 
Cyprus would constitute a casus belli for Greece. Since 
October 1994, and shortly before the entry into force of the 
1982 Law of the Sea Convention, which calls for a territorial 
waters width of up to 12 nautical miles, the Turkish National 
Assembly publicized a Resolution of no legal authority, 
stating that such an extension by Greece would be 
considered a casus belli. Other examples of tension 
between the two countries are the violations of Greek 
airspace by Turkish aircrafts and the challenges to the 
sovereignty status of Aegean islets.8 In addition, the 
                     
4 Fotios Moustakis, “Soft Security Threats in the New Europe: The Case of 
the Balkan Region,” European Security, vol.13, no.1 (2004), pp.139-156. 
5 Fotios Moustakis and Michael Sheehan, “Democratic Peace and the 
European Security Community: The Paradox of Greece and Turkey,” 
Mediterranean Quarterly, vol.13, no.1 (2002), p.82. 
6 Dimitris Keridis and Dimitris Triantafyllou (eds), Greek-Turkish Relations 
in the Era of Globalization (Washington DC: Brassey’s, 2001); Mustafa 
Aydin and Kostas Ifantis (eds), Turkish-Greek Relations: Escaping from 
the Security Dilemma in the Aegean (New York: Frank Cass Publishers, 
2002). 
7 Dokos, “Greece in a Changing Strategic Setting”, 67. 
8 Indicative of the tension that is created during the dogfights between 


































deployment of the surface to air missiles S-300 in Cyprus, 
which put into question the JDD, the Imia/Kardak Crisis in 
1996, which introduced the ‘grey zones’ in the Greek-Turkish 
agenda and the way Greek actors of dubious official 
legitimacy handled the Öcalan Affair, exhibit that 
occasionally the level of tension between the two countries 
can be high.9  
For many years, Greece relied mainly on international 
law, international agreements and the mediating role of the 
United States regarding Greek-Turkish relations. This 
strategy proved rather ineffective in the past. Over the last 
years Athens has made a U-turn in its foreign policy by 
initiating a rapprochement policy towards Turkey (the so 
called ‘earthquake diplomacy’) and relying more on its 
relations with the EU, but also placed emphasis on internal 
balancing by reforming its armed forces. The latter creates 
the need for costly armament projects that constitute a 
serious economic burden for the Greek economy. 10 
After the EU Summit of Helsinki in December 1999, 
Greece has initiated a long-term strategy of stabilising its 
relations with Turkey by accepting the granting of EU 
candidate status to Turkey and endorsing the opening of 
accession negotiations between Turkey and the Union. 
Although this might seem as a rational decision in terms of 
strategic perspective, it is important to point out that in 
common with NATO and the U.S in the past, the EU can not 
provide Greece with credible security guarantees.11 The 
current rapprochement between Athens and Ankara remains 
fragile, since neither country has shifted the agenda from 
‘low’ to high’ politics. As a result and despite the various 
Confidence Building Measures, there is no progress on any 
                                                    
2006, when a Greek and a Turkish F-16 collided about 15 miles south-
southeast of the island of Karpathos and the Greek pilot Costas Iliakis 
was killed.  
9 In the 1980s and mid 1990s Turkey has been conducting military 
operations in its south-eastern region with the Kurdistan’s Worker Party 
(PKK) with thousand of casualties for both sides. In the past Turkey has 
accused Greece for allegedly supporting Abdullah Öcalan and the PKK, 
by training Kurdish fighters and financing its operations. As a result the 
capture of Öcalan in Kenya caused a great diplomatic crisis among 
Greece and Turkey. 
10 Christos Kollias, George Manolas and Suzanna-Maria Paleologou, 
“Military Expenditure and Government Debt in Greece: Some 
Preliminary Empirical Findings,” Defense and Peace Economics, vol.15, 
no.2 (2004), pp.189-197. 
11 Panayotis Tsakonas and Antonis Tournikiotis, “Greece’s Elusive Quest 
for Security Providers: The Expectations-Reality Gap,” Security 
























of the issues related to the Aegean Sea and the Cyprus 
problem remains unresolved.  
To conclude, the challenge for the Greek policy-makers 
after the end of the Cold War was to formulate a security 
policy that would be in accordance with Greece’s obligations 
as a member of the EU and NATO and its geopolitical 
context and at the same time promote its traditional national 
interests. 
Greek Security Policy: The Defining Factors  
In an attempt to further interpret Greece’s security policy, 
certain factors can be identified. In every policy making 
system there are various political, cultural, institutional and 
psychological factors that influence the policy-making 
process. These factors are both endogenous and 
exogenous and reflect recent but also long-standing trends 
in a country’s security policy. The progressive 
Europeanization of Greece’s foreign policy, the continued 
uncertainty that characterises the Greek-Turkish relations, 
the dominant role of personalities in the decision making 
process and the lack of an institutional body that would 
provide long-term assessment on a broad range of security 
issues and assist/coordinate the crisis management 
mechanisms, are the dominant factors that shape Greek 
security policy.  
Participation in the EU and more particularly in the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has inevitably 
expanded the portfolio of Greece’s foreign policy. Rather 
than dealing exclusively with so-called ‘national issues’, 
Greece now has a broadened policy agenda, both 
geographically (Latin America, Asia, Africa) and thematically 
(‘low politics issues’, trade, environment, technology, peace 
keeping operations etc). The process of ‘Europeanization’, - 
meaning the adaptation to European norms and practices - 
has also forced Greek foreign policy to adopt a new style for 
conducting policy, one that is more compatible with the 
European model.12 Mainly after 1996, Greece shifted from a 
rhetorical, symbolic and nationalistic style to a more 
pragmatic and issue-oriented one. Participation in the EU 
                     
12 On the Europeanization of Greek foreign policy see selectively: 
Panayotis Ioakimidis, “The Europeanization of Greece’s Foreign Policy: 
Progress and Problems” in Achilleas Mitsos and Elias Mossialos (eds), 
Contemporary Greece and Europe (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), pp.359-
372; Stelios Stavridis, “The Europeanization of Greek foreign policy: A 
literature review,” Policy Paper, Hellenic Centre for European Studies 


































has forced Greece to abandon its ‘hellenocentric’ approach 
to foreign policy and diplomacy, understand the importance 
of building alliances and has legitimized the concepts of 
negotiations and compromise. Europeanization has also had 
an impact on policy-making structures. For instance, the 
1998 reforms within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs aimed on 
the one hand to create a new structure that would deal 
successfully with low politics issues, given the thematic and 
geographic broadening of Greece’s foreign policy, and on 
the other hand to improve its performance by establishing 
new structures like the Centre for Policy Analysis and 
Planning (CPAP) and the Permanent Crisis Management 
Units (PCMUs). 13 
As mentioned above, Turkey still poses the main threat 
against Greece. Since 1974, the perception that Turkey 
constitutes a potential military threat has been reflected not 
only on public opinion, but also on the political leadership. 
Despite differences in style and rhetoric, both of the major 
parties in Greece have shown remarkable continuity in their 
national security agenda.14 In all the recent policy choices 
(the Greek-Turkish rapprochement and Turkey’s EU 
accession), both major political parties have adopted more 
or less the same approach. Both the Pan-Hellenic Socialist 
Movement and the New Democracy party favour the current 
rapprochement, and support Turkey’s EU candidacy, but 
surprisingly enough neither has developed an alternative 
policy for moving from ‘low’ to ‘high politics’ issues or dealing 
with the Cyprus problem in the post Annan Plan period. This 
continuity might offer a consensus, but at the same time the 
lack of adaptability and alternative scenarios turns out to be 
counterproductive. The decision makers seem reluctant to 
apply alternative scenarios and question the rationale behind 
certain issues. Echoing Byron Theodoropoulos, there are a 
number of questions worth asking. Does the Greek air 
defence really need an air-space of 10 miles? What benefits 
does Greece expect from extending her territorial waters to 
12 nautical miles? Does the Aegean continental shelf have 
any significance?15  
Such questions are rarely addressed in the various 
institutions in both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Ministry of Defence. An important characteristic and a cause 
                     
13 Law 2594/1998. 
14 Tsakonas and Tournikiotis, “Greece’s Elusive Quest for Security 
Providers,”, p.303. 
15 Byron Theodoropoulos, “Greek-Turkish Relations: A New Era?” in 
Theodore Couloumbis, Theodore Kariotis and Fotini Bellou (eds), 
























of Greece’s diplomatic inefficiency is the limited role of 
institutions and bureaucratic structures in the policy 
outcomes. The reason is not so much the lack of a 
constitutional framework or the absence of legally 
established organs, but the fact that the existing institutions 
offer little to the actual policy-making process. The 
institutions are weak, ineffective and operate in a loose 
manner.16 They rarely submit alternative policy scenarios to 
the political leadership, but rather view their role as that of 
implementing policy choices already made by the political 
leadership.  
The main institutional bodies responsible for foreign and 
defence policy - the Cabinet and the Governmental Council 
on Foreign and Defence Matters (GCFDM) - do not produce 
alternative policies. They hardly ever meet and when they 
do, they implement and legitimize the choices already made 
by the Prime Minister and a small group of Ministers. 
Despite the fact that a number of initiatives were undertaken 
in recent years - such as the creation of a Foreign Policy 
Council (FPC)17 and the establishment PCMUs - Greece still 
lacks the proper coordination policy to face the challenges of 
an unstable regional and international environment. The 
FPC consists of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, members of 
all Greek parties represented in Parliament and a number of 
experts. The Council aims to reach a consensus in foreign 
policy issues and offer ‘continuity and consistency’. The sole 
role of the Foreign Policy Council is to offer advice on 
foreign policy issues and not coordinate the other bodies or 
get involved in the crisis management field. The jury is still 
out as to whether the establishment of a new institutional 
body is enough to cover this inefficiency on its own. 
The inefficiency of the institutions places individuals, the 
Prime Minister and Ministers, at the centre of the policy-
making process. The record shows that the major political 
choices on security policy (Greek-Turkish rapprochement 
and support of Turkey’s EU accession), were taken and 
implemented by the Prime Minister and a small group of 
                     
16 Panayotis Ioakimidis, “The Model of Foreign Policy-Making in Greece: 
Personalities versus Institutions,” in Stelios Stavridis, et al, The Foreign 
Policies of the European Union’s Mediterranean States and Applicant 
Countries in the 1990s (London: Macmillan, 1999), pp.144-9. 
17 The Foreign Policy Council consists of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
members of all Greek parties represented in Parliament and a number of 
experts. The Council aims to reach a consensus in foreign policy issues 
and offer ‘continuity and consistency’. The sole role of the Foreign Policy 
Council is to offer advice on foreign policy issues and not coordinate the 


































Ministers and not by collective bodies.18 The record is even 
more marked and worrying in the crisis management field. 
The Imia crisis, the S-300 crisis and the Öcalan case 
demonstrated that the leaders were averse to submitting 
their authority to any institutional discipline or collective body 
of policy-making and instead formed small ad-hoc groups 
that they could control. In a political system, in which leading 
policy makers operate without a strong and effective 
institutional framework, failures will inevitably occur.  
As a result, any major effort to reform the security policy 
should have a strong institutional element and aim to provide 
institutional discipline to the leader’s decision-making 
process. All factors analysed above are important and under 
constant play, but the institutional factor is one that is both 
susceptible to change and able to influence all the others. 
The introduction of a new institution or better coordination of 
the existing ones will take advantage of the positive 
developments that the ‘Europeanization’ brought about and 
counterbalance the negative developments deriving from the 
dominant role of personalities. The establishment of a body 
that will function as a policy oriented think-tank would 
challenge well established beliefs rooted in both society and 
the ruling elite and provide a better understanding of the new 
security environment.  
The Institutional Dimension of Greek Security Policy 
In a parliamentary democracy such as Greece, decisions are 
reached in a collective manner. In particular, the main 
institutions responsible for the security policy are two: the 
Cabinet and the GCFDM (an ad hoc Council, a smaller 
Cabinet), both chaired by the Prime Minister. Although both 
institutions have the right to deal with foreign and defence 
issues, the former has entrusted expanded responsibilities to 
the latter and therefore the GCFDM is the main instrument 
responsible for the national security policy. It is composed of 
the Prime Minister (Chair), the ministers of Foreign Affairs, 
Defence, Finance, Interior, Development, National Economy, 
Environment and the under-secretary of Foreign Affairs. 
Depending on the issue at stake other ministers and the 
Chief of the National Defence General Staff may also 
participate. The GCFDM is responsible for shaping the 
national defence and national security policy, reaching 
decisions about foreign policy and defence matters, deciding 
                     
























about the structure of the armed forces, the promotion of 
high-rank officers and defence procurement issues, setting 
the country in a state of partial or total mobilisation of its 
means and resources and finally organising a crisis 
management body.19  
The ad hoc creation of a crisis management body within 
the GCFDM is a paradox. The latter lacks the proper 
physical infrastructure, a support mechanism that would 
coordinate the crisis management strategy and provide 
alternative scenarios. The physical infrastructure that is 
needed to monitor the evaluation of crises in real time, the 
gathering of officials and experts that are scattered in 
various ministries and organisations is a time consuming 
and complex task that can not be accomplished on an ad 
hoc basis.20 Despite repeated pledges for the creation of a 
Secretariat, the GCFDM still lacks one, thus coordination in 
both times of peace and especially crisis can only be limited; 
it depends on the respective Ministers’ ad hoc institutional 
cooperation.21 
During a crisis, the GCFDM must coordinate the existing 
instruments in the ministries of foreign affairs and defence, 
like the CPAP and the PCMUs, both in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, as well as the Strategic Studies Directorate 
(SSD), which is a civilian crisis management unit in the 
Ministry of Defence. The CPAP and the PCMUs are not 
directly involved in the policy making process, but are rather 
more academically oriented. Indeed despite its name the 
latter is not a crisis management instrument, since its 
responsibility is to conduct simulations and prepare the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs response in a crisis situation. 
Therefore the PCMUs have only an advisory role and they 
do not actually ‘manage’ the crisis.22 The issue of 
coordination gets even more complicated if we take under 
consideration that most crises involve more than just the 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence. The GCFDM (or 
any other institution) should also be able to coordinate the 
National Intelligence Service (NIS) and the Hellenic, the 
                     
19 For a detailed analysis of the structure and role of the Governmental 
Council on Foreign and Defence Matters see George Papastamkos, 
Vasilios Gikas and Petros Liacouras, National and European Security 
and Crisis Management (Athens: Ant. N. Sakkoula, 2002), pp.42-47, 
146-155 (in Greek). 
20 Ioannis Mazis, “Establishing a National Security Council in Greece,” 
Defensor Pacis, Issue 17 (2005), pp.168-169. 
21 Papastamkos, Gikas, and Liacouras, National and European Security 
and Crisis Management, p.81. 


































Coast Guard (for which the Ministry of Mercantile Marine is 
responsible) and the Ministry of Press and Mass Media. 
As a result of the above, the GCFDM is unable to 
actually provide critical advice to the nation’s leadership 
during a period of crisis. Surprisingly, the members of the 
GCFDM who are responsible for reaching decisions about 
the crisis management strategy are unaware of crisis 
management principles, rules of engagements, the military 
jargon and technical details involving military operations. 
The fact that decision-makers should participate in crisis-
management simulations and exercises, a common practice 
in other countries, does not seem to apply in the Greek 
case.   
Low-intensity conflicts that took place the last decade 
demonstrate vividly the inability of Greek security and crisis 
management mechanisms. The Imia/Kardak Crisis was 
(mis)handled not by the GCFDM as it should be, but by a 
small ad hoc group, where the Prime Minister and the 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the Defence monopolized 
the decision making process and made no use of the 
relevant institutional bodies. More striking is the fact that this 
idiosyncratic team could not establish a channel of 
communication with the Turkish side; the negotiations 
regarding the settlement of the crisis were actually achieved 
through the involvement of the USA.23 The Öcalan case was 
again managed by an ad hoc team, consisting of the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Interior, the 
Secretary of the Cabinet (working as a link to the Prime 
Minister) and the Director of the NIS. The Greek government 
denied providing asylum to the Kurdish guerrilla leader, 
since that would have added unwanted tension in Greek-
Turkish relations. The decision to send the PKK leader in 
Kenya, where a large number of US intelligence officers 
where placed after the terrorist attacks that took place in the 
U.S Embassy, was wrong both in political and operational 
terms.24  
Based on the above, the need for a new institution that 
will be able to coordinate the existing bodies scattered in 
various ministries, offer sound and timely advice on a wide 
                     
23 For a detailed account on Greece’s crisis management strategy during 
the Imia/Kardak Crisis see Efstathios Fakiolas and Panayiotis Mavrides, 
“Strategy of Crisis Management and the Greek-Turkish Rivalry: The 
Case of the Imia Islets,” in Christodoulos Yiallourides and Panayiotis 
Tsakonas (eds), Greece and Turkey After the End of the Cold War (New 
York: Aristide Caratzas Publishers, 2001), pp.205-238.  
24 On the Öcalan case see Thanos Dokos and Panayotis Tsakonas, 
Shaping National Strategy and Crisis Management (Athens: Defence 
























range of issues, establish a strict crisis management 
mechanism, and oversee each step of the policy-making and 
crisis management policy is worth examining.  
National Security Council: The Missing Element?  
Establishing an institution like the NSC would provide better 
coordination of the existing institutions (Ministry of Defense, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Interior etc), assist the 
crisis management mechanism and contribute in shaping 
Greek security policy. The idea for creating a NSC is not 
new in Greece. Indeed, the NSC existed on paper during the 
period 1986-1996. There was a resolution by the Cabinet in 
1986 referring to its creation, but in practice it was never 
established and in 1996 it was abolished. Diplomatic 
mishandlings, and the recent establishment of new 
institutions within the MFA and MoD as mentioned above, 
gave new momentum to an already existing idea. The 
present legal framework allows for the creation of a 
coordinative and consultative body within the GCFDM.25 The 
proposals about the establishment of a National Security 
Council outline an institution of coordinative and consultative 
nature that will assist the GCFDM and will come under the 
Prime Minister’s power.26  
The establishment of a NSC is needed in order to 
provide a detailed evaluation of threats to national security, 
to assist the leadership in shaping the national foreign and 
defence policy, to draft scenarios concerning possible 
threats, to coordinate the activities of other crisis 
management bodies and offer a synthesis of the views 
expresses by the various ministries and committees and 
finally to function as a leadership training centre.27 
Based on the international practise, the NSC reports to 
and is controlled by the head of the state. Keeping in mind 
that the NSC in its original form is designed to serve the 
presidential model, certain legislative reforms will have to be 
adopted to ensure on the one hand that the Prime Minister 
will be at the centre of the process and on the other hand 
                     
25 Papastamkos, Gikas, and Liacouras, National and European Security 
and Crisis Management, p.46. 
26 Regarding the proposals for the establishment of a Greek National 
Security Council see selectively: Papastamkos, Gikas, and Liacouras, 
National and European Security and Crisis Management, pp.155-171; 
Dokos and Tsakonas, Shaping National Strategy and Crisis 
Management, 94-108; Mazis, “Establishing a National Security Council 
in Greece,”, pp.165-186. 


































that the government will not lose its collective action ability. 
Therefore, uncritically applying the ‘NSC model’ that is used 
in the US’s governmental system is not an option.28  
A critical issue is the (competitive) relation between the 
GCFDM and the NSC in times of both crisis and peace. The 
parallel activation of the NSC should not undermine the 
ability of the GCFDM to make decisions, but rather provide 
flexibility by coordinating the various parts and offer 
alternative policies. Therefore a critical link between the 
decisive instrument (GCFDM and Prime Minister) and the 
consultative one (NSC) should be established. This role can 
only be undertaken by the National Security Advisor (NSA).29 
The latter should basically ensure the intermediate role of 
the NSC - among the various decentralized units and the 
GCFDM.30 The National Security Advisor should preserve 
the NSC from turning into a hyper-institution that will end up 
being stiff and causing rivalry among its various parts.  
The synthesis of the NSC should be similar to that of the 
GCFPD, but also broader. Apart from the Prime Minister 
(chairing) and the ministers that already participate in the 
GCFPD, actors like the NSA, the Director of the NIS and the 
Chief of the Hellenic Defence General Staff should also 
participate. The National Security Council should be staffed 
by military personnel, diplomats, higher officers from other 
services, specialists and technocrats. Having a ‘mixed’ staff 
will allow the NSC to develop a military/civil culture that will 
allow it to reach broader consensus, gain flexibility, cope 
with by-ministerial antagonism and understand better the 
complex international environment. 
Although there is no agreement on its exact structure, 
the majority of analysts suggest that the Greek NSC should 
consist of the following: (a) the Secretariat that will be 
responsible for the administrative support, (b) the Strategic 
Analysis & Planning Centre that will analyse all aspects that 
are related to the national security policy, (c) the Crisis 
Management Centre that will coordinate the efforts of all the 
other bodies, centres and services and assist the leadership 
during a crisis,31 (d) the Intelligence Unit that will evaluate 
                     
28 Papastamkos, Gikas, and Liacouras, National and European Security 
and Crisis Management, pp.166-168. 
29 Steven Redd, “The Influence of Advisers on Foreign Policy Decision 
Making,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol.46, no.3 (2002), pp.335-364. 
30 Papastamkos, Gikas, and Liacouras 2002, p.47; Dokos and Tsakonas 
2004, p.98. 
31 The prime responsibilities of a Crisis Management Centre should be 
technical support, information fusion, data base management, indicators 
and warning analysis, and development of doctrine and procedures on 
























and combine the information provided by the ministries and 
other crisis management bodies, and (e) the Political 
Communication Unit that will be responsible for public 
diplomacy and perception management.32  
Key to the success of the NSC is to create a small, 
coherent and flexible unit that will assist the Prime Minister 
and the GCFDM and not replace them. Nevertheless, 
without the sufficient political will, the NSC might actually 
produce new problems. In particular, the Prime Minister 
might manipulate the NSC. The prospect of turning the NSC 
into an instrument that will mainly serve the Prime Minister is 
obviously a negative prospect within a parliamentary 
democracy. In addition, balancing the technocratic and 
political character of the council poses another great 
challenge. Institutional rivalry between the NSA and the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, as well as the tendency of the 
former to become a hyper-minister with increased powers, 
should also be taken under consideration.33 Turf wars 
between the NIS and the Intelligence Unit about the 
intelligence product, or tension between the Crisis 
Management Centre and other bodies that are scattered in 
the ministries might also occur.  
Conclusions 
The review of the Greek security policy illustrates the 
deficiencies of its institutional dimension. This inefficiency 
derives not only from the fact that the existing structures are 
inadequate and poorly organized, but also from the fact that 
the current political culture does not favour a strict and 
effective institutional framework that will assist the decision 
makers and even control the outcomes of the policy-making 
process. Indicative of the above is the fact that the Greek 
political leadership was reluctant to use the available 
institutions during recent crises. The NSC, as every 
bureaucratic institution will have problems regarding its 
                                                    
of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense and the Intelligence 
Community. 
32 For more details on the structure of the proposed National Security 
Council see selectively: Papastamkos, Gikas, and Liacouras, National 
and European Security and Crisis Management, pp.161-164; Dokos and 
Tsakonas, Shaping National Strategy and Crisis Management, pp.99-
107 and Mazis, “Establishing a National Security Council in Greece,”, 
pp.173-185. 
33  Papastamkos, Gikas, and Liacouras, National and European Security 


































organization, role and coordination policy but then again the 
planners of such an institution will have the benefit of 
learning from others that have introduced similar bodies in 
their policy-making structure. As a result, it can be argued 
that the missing element is not only the establishment of a 
new institution, but also the need to accompany the 
establishment of such an institution with the proper political 
culture. Therefore, adding simply a new institution is not the 
solution. A new institutional body like the NSC might provide 
flexibility and better coordination, but it will not solve 
problems that are inherent to the Greek political system, like 
the dominant role of the Prime Minister, or the reluctance of 
the political elite to receive advice. 
Simply establishing the NSC or a similar institution 
should not be seen as a panacea for Greek security policy, 
but rather as the first necessary step towards a more 
organized and effective national security policy. Creating an 
instrument that will adjust to the current institutional 
framework, make the most of the existing apparatus and 
confront its endogenous shortcomings is probably a rational 
action that can be taken. Building an institutional system of 
policy-making will contribute in ‘shaping’ a political culture 
that will allow old and new institutions to function 
synergistically, that will aim for systematic and rigorous 
decision-making and that will be willing to receive advice and 
examine alternative policy scenarios.  
 
